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MODIFIED TO FIT YOUR SCREEN:
DVD PLAYBACK TECHNOLOGY, COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT OR FAIR USE?
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the trajectory of technology has been geared toward
improving and strengthening consumer control over in-home viewing of
television and movies.' A stream of new digital video disk ("DVD")
playback technologies, which lately has flooded the home theater market,2
now empowers viewers to sanitize their DVDs.3 This new and widely
available software temporarily masks offensive content, including nudity,
violence, and profanity . The video cassette recorder ("VCR") was the first
device which allowed consumers to control how and when they viewed
recorded programs.
Today, digital video recorders, like TiVo and
ReplayTV, enable viewers to digitally record their television programs in
order to watch them at a more convenient time, and also to skip
commercials with a super-fast-forward remote control feature. Although
there are certain items consumers cannot skip or fast-forward through,
generally the DVD player allows consumers the freedom and control to

1. See Patrick Goldstein, The Big Picture: This Dad Demands Final Cut, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at E l. This article asserts that the advancement in technology toward consumer control
will be difficult to take away and advising the Directors Guild of America that "if you tell parents
they're lawbreakers when they try to do right by their kids, you're going to find a lot of people
daring you to rip those family-friendly filters out of their cold, dead hands." Id. at E6.
2. See Press Release, IDC, Global DVD Market Continues to Expand and Mature Rapidly,
According
to
IDC
(Oct.
27,
2003),
http://www.broadcastnewsroom.com/2003/10_Oct/news/idcreport 1026.htm.
3. For clarification, this comment will discuss how the software functions only in terms of
the DVD format even though some software works in conjunction with video cassette tapes.
4. Goldstein, supra note 1, at El.
5. See Mark S. Lee, Clean Cut, 26 L.A. LAW. 46,48 (May 2003) (discussing the technology
trend toward giving the consumer more control over how and when they watch their programs);
see also Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 409-11
(2003) (explaining how TiVo and ReplayTV permit consumers to manipulate how and when they
consume broadcast television by enabling them to exercise a strong degree of control over
recording, fast-forwarding, and skipping commercials).
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watch movies out of sequence with the scene selection feature. 6 As a
logical step in the field of consumer-geared technologies, the newest DVD
playback software encourages consumers to further customize their
viewing experience by giving them the option to omit aspects of films
which they find personally offensive or inappropriate. 7
The primary software manufacturers of this specific breed of DVD
playback software have recently been dragged into an ongoing lawsuit.8
Allegations against the manufacturers include copyright infringement and
other various causes of action. 9 One may initially respond hesitantly when,
at first glance, one senses elements of censorship. However, upon closer
inspection of the underlying facts and legal issues, it appears that these
software companies are arguably not doing anything legally wrong-at
least within the realm of copyright law. The case that now pends against
these software manufacturers revolves around two distinct breeds of
companies: (1) retail video and DVD editors, and (2) DVD playback
software manufacturers.' 0 The retail editors rent or sell videocassettes and
DVDs, which the company has permanently altered by removing offensive
content. 1" By contrast, the software companies distribute
software that
2
temporarily filters the DVD and masks offensive content.'
Initially, these editing procedures and technologies appear to fall into
the same category. However, they are functionally and legally distinct.
Both breeds of companies may share a common goal of providing films3
that are "family friendly" and excised of their offensive content.'
However, the functional difference in how each group achieves its
alterations-making actual cuts in a copy of the film versus temporarily
filtering out specific content in the film-suggests opposite legal
conclusions. As will be addressed in the text of this Comment, software
6. See Lee, supra note 5, at 48.
7. See Katie Dean, Much Ado About Smut-Free DVDs, WIRED.COM (June 30, 2003), at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,59071,00.html.
8. Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al., Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug. 29,
2002).
9. See id.
10. See Drew Clark, Sanitizing Hollywood: Why American DirectorsHave No Moral Rights
to
Their
Movies,
MSNBC.COM
(Jan.
20,
2003),
at
wysiwyq://46/http://www.msnbc.coni/news/861899.asp?0s1=-1.
11. See
Rent
Movies,
CLEANFLICKS.COM,
at
http://www.cleanflicks.com/company/index.php?file=buy (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter
CleanFlicks' Movie Rental]. CleanFlicks gives the consumer the option of sending a VHS/DVD
movie that the company will edit and return to the consumer or having CleanFlicks purchase and
edit the VHS/DVD movie and ship it to the consumer. Id.
12. See Clark, supra note 10 (contrasting two different ways of editing).
13. See id
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manufacturers should not fall into the same legal category as the retail
editors because, unlike those retailers, the software does not generate a
derivative work. Furthermore, even if the court makes a copyright
infringement determination, these software manufacturers should arguably
be entitled to a fair use defense. This Comment will not discuss the
possible violations committed by the retail editors. However, on its face, it
seems that the core of the discrepancy between permanent edits versus
transitory masking is an important one that separates the software
manufacturers from the retailers. Although the software manufacturers
face multiple allegations, including violations of the Lanham Act,
trademark dilution, unfair competition, and copyright infringement, 4 this
Comment will focus only on the copyright infringement counterclaims
against the DVD playback software manufacturers.
Part II of this Comment discusses Huntsman v. Soderbergh,15 a
pending case that presents the first legal challenge to the DVD playback
software. Part III addresses background issues surrounding DVD playback
technology, including a discussion of the technology itself, relevant
statutes, and case law. Part IV addresses whether the software infringes on
one of the five enumerated rights exclusive to copyright holders in the
audiovisual works whose playback is altered. Regardless of whether this
new software creates a copyright infringement, Part V asserts that these
software manufacturers should be protected by a fair use defense. Part VI
addresses policy considerations implicated by the fair use determination,
including the potential impact on consumer rights. Part VII explores
potential future technology and speculates as to copyright lines that may be
crossed in the future. Finally, Part VIII concludes that the software
companies should be granted their motion for summary judgment.
However, if the court denies the motion by the software companies, this
DVD playback software, in its present state, should not be found in
violation of copyright laws. Alternatively, in the event the court finds there
has been copyright infringement, the manufacturers should be able to assert
the affirmative defense of fair use.
II. THE CLEANFLICKS CASE: HUNTSMAN V. SODERBERGH16
In August 2002, Robert Hunstman i7 and CleanFlicks of Colorado,
14. See Defendants' Motion For Leave To Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants at 8-9,
Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. Filed Sept. 20, 2002).
15. Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al., Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug. 29,
2002).
16. Id.
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LLC18 (collectively "CleanFlicks") filed suit against sixteen well-known
members of the Directors Guild of America ("DGA"), including Martin
Scorsese, Steven Soderbergh, Robert Altman, Sidney Pollack, and Steven
Spielberg (collectively "Defendant Directors").' 9 CleanFlicks is a video

rental chain that rents altered videos that have been edited for offensive
content. 20 CleanFlicks' suit was a preemptory move against a likely action
by these directors. 21 Plaintiffs sought to have a federal judge uphold
CleanFlicks' right to rent and sell sanitized versions of motion pictures
directed by the named Defendant Directors.22
In September 2002, the Defendant Directors filed an answer to the
Plaintiffs' complaint.23 At the same time, the DGA responded by filing a

motion for leave to intervene as a representative of not only the sixteen
named DGA members, but its entire membership. 4 The DGA also filed a
motion to compel joinder of a number of studios as copyright holders of the
films being edited, because they were necessary and indispensable
parties. 25 The DGA filed counterclaims against the originally named
plaintiffs, but also sought to join as counterdefendants additional retail
17. Robert Huntsman is an inventor with a movie editing technology patent pending. Peter
Kiefer & Chris Marlowe, CleanFlicks Fires First Shot in Suit Against Top Directors,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Aug. 30, 2002, at 1.
18. CleanFlicks is a video rental chain that rents videos that the company has permanently
altered by editing out offensive content. See CleanFlicks'Movie Rental, supranote 10.
19. See Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al., Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug.
29, 2002). The other named directors are Michael Apted, Taylor Hackford, Curtis Hanson,
Norman Jewison, John Landis, Michael Mann, Phillip Noyce, Brad Silberling, Betty Thomas,
Irwin Winkler, and Robert Redford. Id. See also Lawsuit Against Hollywood Directors,
VIEWERFREEDOM.ORG (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://www.viewerfreedom.org/print.php?sid=55.
20. See CleanFlicks' Movie Rental, supra note 11.
21. Kiefer & Marlowe, supra note 17, at 1. The plaintiffs filed a preemptive strike upon
discovering via the DGA's website that the DGA had been planning a suit against them. Id. By
filing first, CleanFlicks has ensured its choice of venue in Colorado and forum selection, and
prevented itself from having to defend a case that probably would have been filed in California by
the DGA. See id.
22. See Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al., Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug.
29, 2002). CleanFlicks also asserted its First Amendment right to edit videos and DVDs for
private home use. Id.
23. See Defendant Director's Answer to Amended Complaint, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Sept. 20, 2002).
24. Defendant Directors Guild of America's Motion for Leave to Intervene at 3, Huntsman
et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Sept. 20, 2002).
25. See Defendant Directors' Motion To Compel Joinder of Third-Party Copyright Holders
As Necessary Parties Pursuant To Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) at
2, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Sept. 20, 2002); see also
Press Release, Directors Guild of America, DGA Responds and Counterclaims Against Robert
Huntsman and CleanFlicks; Adds Motion Picture Studios to Suit (Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.dga.org/news/prexpand.php3?28 1.
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editors resembling CleanFlicks, that engaged in similar editing and
distribution of videocassettes or DVDs. 26 Moreover, the DGA sought to
join manufacturing companies that produce DVD playback software that
filters out offensive content during playback, including ClearPlay, Inc.,
Trilogy Studios, Inc., and Family Shield Technologies, LLC (collectively
"Counterdefendants"), on the grounds that the Counterdefendants engaged
in similar conduct as CleanFlicks and therefore, implicated common
questions of law and fact. 2 7 The DGA's counterclaims against both the
retail editors and the software manufacturers alleged violations of the
Lanham Act,28 trademark dilution, unfair competition, and copyright
infringement.
In December 2002, the eight major studios (collectively "Defendant
Studios"), which the DGA sought to bring in as co-defendants, joined the
lawsuit.2 9 Most importantly, as copyright holders of the films, the studios
had standing to assert copyright infringement claims against the retail
editors and software manufacturers. 30
The studios also sought an
injunction to stop the distribution of the sanitized films by the retail editors
and the filtering technology by the software manufacturers.31
In early January 2003, ClearPlay, along with the other self-titled
"Player Control Parties," 32 filed a response to the studios' allegations, and
made a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the Player Control
Parties.33 The studios filed a response to ClearPlay's allegations in early
26. See Defendant Directors' Motion For Leave To Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants
at 1-2, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Sept. 20, 2002).
Other named retail editors making up the Counterdefendants include Video II, Glenn Dickman,
J.W.D. Management Corporation, MyCleanFlicks, Clean Cut Cinemas, Family Safe Media,
EditMyMovies, Family Flix, U.S.A., LLC, and Play It Clean Video. Id
27. Id. at 2.
28. See id at 8-9. See generally Scott W. Breedlove, Clean Flicks v. Hollywood:
Intellectual Property Owners Losing Control, 15 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6 (June 2003)
(providing background and discussion of the entire CleanFlickscase).
29. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 13, 2002). The eight studios who have
joined the suit are Disney, Dreamworks, Fox, Paramount, MGM, Sony, Universal, and Time
Warner [hereinafter referred to collectively as "the studios"]. Id. See also Ray Richmond, War
Over Who Gets to Say "Cut!" Expands, 27-5 DGA MAGAZINE, (Jan. 2003),
http://www.dga.org/news/v27_5/newsdigitalpiracy3.php3.
30. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Answer and Counterclaims at 5-6, Huntsman et
al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 13, 2002).
31. Id.at 5.
32. Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed June 5, 2003). See Peter Kiefer, Clearplay Files Response in Video Editing Lawsuit,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Jan. 7, 2003.
33. Kiefer, supra note 32.
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February 2003. 34 On February 14, 2003, a scheduling conference was
conducted in Denver, Colorado-one that is surely to be followed by many
similar events in 2004. 35 In response to requests by the court and by
counsel for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, the studios filed a Statement
Clarifying Claims on March 11, 2003 .36
On May 30, 2003, the Counterdefendants filed a Motion for Summary
judgment.37 Thereafter, the Counterdefendants filed a Corrected Opening
Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on June 5, 2003.38
The studios then filed a Response Brief in Opposition to the Player Control
Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on August 8, 2003. 39 On
December 15, 2003, ClearPlay, 40 Family Shield,4' and Trilogy 42 each
individually filed reply briefs in support of their collective Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Defendant Directors filed a Motion for Leave to
File Surreply to address new cases raised by the reply briefs of ClearPlay
and Trilogy that had been decided after the Defendant Directors had
already filed their Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.43
Since the beginning of this lawsuit, there have been several unnamed
parties who have voiced their opinions about the suit. Most notably, the
34. See Studios Reject ClearPlay'sAllegations, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Feb. 4, 2003, at 6.
35. See Ray Richmond, CleanFlicks Update: The Battle Continues, 27-6 DGA MAGAZINE,
Mar. 2003, at http://www.dga.org/news/v27_6/newsdigitalpiracy4.php3?section=news.
36. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003).
37. See Defendant Director Parties' Motion For Leave To File Surreply, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Jan. 7, 2004).
38. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
39. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studio, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8, 2003).
40. ClearPlay filed two reply briefs, one to address the directors' claims and a separate one
to address the studios' claims. Counterdefendant ClearPlay Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of the
Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Studios' Copyright Claims,
Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 15, 2003);
Counterdefendant ClearPlay Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of the Player Control Parties' Motion
for Summary Judgment on the Directors' Copyright Claims, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al.
(No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 15, 2003).
41. See Counterdefendant Family Shield's Consolidated Reply in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec.
15, 2003).
42. See Counterdefendant Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s Reply to the Briefs Filed By the Studios
and Director Parties in Opposition to the Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 15, 2003).
43. See Defendant Director Parties' Motion For Leave To File Surreply, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Jan. 7, 2004).
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Screen Actors Guild, the Writers Guild of America, and The Film
Foundation have each released press statements supporting the DGA's46
45
counterclaims. 44 Intel Corporation and Electronic Frontier Foundation
have filed amici curiae briefs on behalf of ClearPlay and other named
software manufacturers who sell similar software.4 7
III. BACKGROUND
A. DVD Playback Technology

Although there are differences between the various sanitizing
software programs, playback technology generally works by altering how
the consumer experiences an unedited version of the original copyrighted
film. 48

While there are already future plans to release DVD players

embedded with the filtering technology, 49 the software is primarily
available via computer downloads. 50 Presently, the consumer-downloaded
software runs simultaneously with the DVD (or videocassette), 5' and

44. See Press Release, Screen Actors Guild, Screen Actors Guild Supports DGA Members
(Sept. 11, 2002), at http://www.dga.org/news/prsagsupportsdgastance.php3; Press Release,
Writers Guild of America, WGA News: WGAw Condemns Lawsuit Targeting Directors Guild
President Speaks Out Against CleanFlicks Federal Lawsuit Against 16 Directors (Sept. 3, 2002),
http://www.wga.org/pr/0902/speaks.html; Press Release, The Film Foundation, The Film
Foundation Supports DGA Countersuit Against Unauthorized Editing of Films (Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.film-foundation.org/news/detail.cfn?QID=1255.
45. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Intel Corporation in Support of Counterdefendant ClearPlay
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed July 11, 2003); see also Dave McNary & Paul Sweeting, Intel Backs ClearPlay
Against
Suit,
VARIETY.COM
(Aug.
12,
2002),
at
http://www.variety.coml/index.asp?layout-print-story&articleid=VR 111789071 0&category=20
(quoting an excerpt from the filing: allowing directors and studios to prevail "would chill
innovation and stifle the development of new generations of products, including products
designed to empower the individual and enhance the consumer's lawful and reasonable
enjoyment of lawfully acquired entertainment content"). Id.
46. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 18, 2003).
47. See Edward C. Baig, Four on the Floor at Electronics Show, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2003,
at D3.
48. See id.
49. See id
50. See id.
51. At this time, MovieShield is the only software which works with both DVD and
videocassettes. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in
Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-12, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al.
(No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
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instructs the DVD to skip the visuals or mute the audio of offensive
content. 52 The software works by referencing the time codes, which are
already embedded in the DVD when it is produced by the studios, and
instructing the DVD where to skip according to the time codes. 53 The filter
files are the downloaded time-coding instructions used to direct the DVD
player when to skip or mute content.5 4 "If decapitation and bullets tearing
through flesh are shown from 00:48:49:00 to 00:48:58:00 on a DVD, the
Filter File will identify that nine-second segment to be skipped." 55 The
original film visuals and content are not embedded in the software in any
detailed fashion, nor are there any interim copies made of the DVD in order
to create the masking instructions.5 6 The software only works in
conjunction with authentic, i.e. not bootleg, DVDs and the software
57
manufacturers only license its software for private home use.
As described on ClearPlay's website, ClearPlay refers to the filter
files as the "ClearPlay Filters." 58 The ClearPlay Filters are determined by
the ClearPlay staff who view each film and program the software to
instruct the DVD to filter out selected offensive content.5 9 The employees
use four criteria to determine offensive content: (1) blood and gore; (2)
52. Id at

10.

53. Id. at 11 (providing a detailed example of how the timing instructions work); see Brief
of Amicus Curiae of Intel Corporation in Support of Counterdefendant ClearPlay Inc.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo.
filed July 11, 2003) (explaining the playback technology and likening the playback command via
time coding to referring to a book by page); see also McNary & Sweeting, supra note 45.
54. Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
55. Id. (providing a detailed example of how the timing instructions work).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 6, 9.
58. ClearPlay:
The
Technology
of
Choice!,
CLEARPLAY.COM,
at
http://www.clearplay.com/what.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter ClearPlay: The
Technology of Choice!].
59. See id; see also Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in
Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No.
02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003) (describing how "ClearPlay employees review movies
that have been released on DVD and create timing data for offensive segments that occur on the
different DVDs."). Although the software manufacturers are distinguishing themselves from
CleanFlicks by arguing that their technology is like fast forwarding via remote control, the DGA
is asserting the opposite. Regardless of whether any permanent edits are made by the software
manufacturers, the DGA argues that the fact that human beings have to program the software in
order to instruct the DVD to skip over offensive content makes the software the legal equivalent
of CleanFlicks and other retail editors who make hard cuts in the films and distribute them. See
Ray Richmond, Battle Lines Drawn in War Over Who Gets To Say "Cut!", 27-4 DGA
MAGAZINE,
Nov.
2002,
at
http://www.dga.org/news/v27_4/feat-digitalpiracy2.php3?section=news.
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violence, drug use, and other crude behavior; (3) profanity; and (4) sex and
nudity. 60 After downloading the filter application, the consumer also
downloads a filter file specifically developed to work in conjunction with a
The downloaded filter file then
specific motion picture DVD. 6'
communicates with the DVD decoder software and instructs it to skip predetermined offensive content using the timing data gathered by ClearPlay
employees.62 ClearPlay's website provides consumers with a website link
for each
film where the company indicates the extent of filters used on each
63
film.

Family Shield Technologies, LLC, offers software titled MovieShield
that allows the consumer to customize the playback by selecting from eight
screening categories containing content which Family Shield employees
have pre-screened and deemed offensive. 64 The consumer downloads
software files containing timing instructions that correspond to skip
portions of a film containing any content which falls into MovieShield's
eight screening categories.65 The MovieShield software files consist of
time templates and do not contain any copies or displays from the motion
pictures.66 The third named software Counterdefendant, Trilogy Studios,
Inc., functions similarly to the other software manufacturers. Trilogy offers
the MovieMask Player software with three different rating categories.6 7
Within those three categories, MovieMask provides the viewer with four
different rating levels to choose from, ranging from M8, the general level,

60. Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
61. See id at 9.
62. See id. at 10.
63. Movielist, CLEARPLAY.COM, at http://www.clearplay.com/list.asp (last visited Nov. 26,
2003) [hereinafter ClearPlay Movielist]. On ClearPlay's website, each movie title has its own
link where the film is rated by the "ClearPlay Factor." Id. According to blood and gore,
profanity, sex and nudity, and violence, ClearPlay rates the film on a scale from mild to heavy for
the film both before and after sanitizing. Id.
64. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003) (detailing MovieShield's eight screening categories viewers
can select to skip during playback of a DVD or VHS, including disturbing visuals, immodesty,
minor language, major language, nudity, religious references, sexual situations and violence).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 7.
67. See What is MovieMask?, MOVIEMASK.COM, at http://moviemask.com/what.php (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004) [hereinafter What is MovieMask?]; see also Counterdefendant Player
Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at
12, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
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to M19, the adult level.6 8
The aforementioned technologies appear to provide distinctive
functions. However, they have critical elements in common-all of the
DVD playback software function using time-coding instructions and none
of the DVD playback software makes any permanent alterations to the
DVD nor makes an interim copy of the DVD.69
B. Statutory Background
There are five fundamental rights that section 106 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 enumerates as exclusive rights of copyright holders.70 A
copyright holder has the exclusive authority over: (1) reproduction; (2)
derivative works; (3) distribution and sale; (4) public performance; and (5)
public display.71 These exclusive rights are, however, subject to certain
exceptions delineated in sections 107 through 122.72 The legislative history
of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides further insight into the definitions of
this "bundle of rights."7 3 Congress defined a reproduction of a work to be
68. See What is MovieMask?, supra note 67 (outlining the three available categories of
language, violence and adult themes and suggesting a rating level depending on the age of the
viewer); see also Gary Gentile, Content-CleaningSoftware Angers Some, SILICONVALLEY.COM
(Feb. 3, 2003), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorialU5094390.htm
(describing how MovieMask technicians scan films frame by frame and then create templates that
mask frames according to the filtering selections made).
69. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, 11-12, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003). It is interesting to note here that similar technology
already exists to filter television content, such as the TVGuardian, which works by monitoring the
closed captioning and "bleeping out" profanity. ClearPlay and similar software are more
advanced because they have the ability to filter out more than just profanity. See Mick Lockey,
Review: ClearPlay, DVD-Filtering Software Joins Growing List of Parental Control Tools,
TECHTV.COM
(Feb.
7,
2003),
at
http://www.techtv.com/products/software/story/0,23008,3371044,00.html; see also TVGuardian:
"The ProfanityFilter,' EDITMYMOVIES.COM, at http://www.editmymovies.com/tvguardian.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004) (detailing the features of the TVGuardian).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
71. Id
72. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122 (2003). Section 107 of the Code-the fair use doctrine-is
the only limitation relevant to this discussion of DVD playback technology. While it may seem
at first glance that section 109-the first sale doctrine-would be applicable here, it is not. The
first sale doctrine governs the effect of transfer of a particular copy on the copyright holder's
rights. The gist of the doctrine is as follows: after the first sale, the purchaser may sell his
individual copy or dispose of it without the consent of the copyright holder. Because neither
consumers nor ClearPlay and other DVD playback software manufacturers are selling DVDs or
disposing of them, the first sale doctrine is not at issue. The consumers are watching an altered
playback of the original DVD, which is outside the purview of section 109. See 17 U.S.C. § 109
(2003).
73. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5674.
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where "its fixation in tangible form must be 'sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.', 7 4 As an example of conduct
that would not constitute
reproduction, Congress cites showing images on a
"screen or tube., 75 However, Congress indicated that while these images
may not constitute a reproduction under clause (1), such images could fall
under the exclusive right of clause (5), the right of public display.76
With respect to the right to prepare derivative works, the legislative
history distinguishes between the right of reproduction under clause (1) and
the right to prepare derivative works under clause (2).fl Section 101 of the
Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as follows:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship ....78

Although a reproduction must be fixed, there is some dispute as to
whether a derivative work requires fixation.7 9 Fixation, according to
Congress, "would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television.., or captured momentarily in the 'memory'
of a computer., 80 Therefore, while the above reproductions may not create
true reproductions because they do not fulfill the fixation requirement, such
works may still constitute derivative works as "[a] derivative work... 8may
be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form." '
It is also important to note what is noticeably absent from these
rights.82 Sections 106(4) and 106(5) of the Copyright Act protect the right
74. Id.at 5675; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (defining "fixed").
75. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5675.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
79. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5675. Congress included "fixation" in its definition
of a "reproduction" but not a "derivative work." Circuits have interpreted the requirements for a
derivative work differently. Id.
80. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5666.
81. See id at 5675.
82. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Huntsman et al. v.
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of public performance and the right of public display, meaning only public
uses are protected rights.83 Because the Copyright Act refers to the rights
named in section 106 as enumerated rights, this suggests that any rights not
named are not covered by the protection of the Copyright Act.84 Under the
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term "public" is
partially defined as "outside of a normal circle of a family ....
,85
As
Congress stated, "[t]he term 'a family' in this context would include an
individual living alone, so that a gathering confined to the individual's
social acquaintances would normally be regarded as private. 86 Therefore,
by inference, a performance or display that is within the private domain,
such as, within a person's home, is not one of the enumerated rights.
Even if there has been an infringement of one of the enumerated
rights under section 106, the fair use doctrine serves as a defense and
limitation on those exclusive rights.87 Section 107 provides a list of four
criteria a court should consider when determining whether there has been
fair use of a copyrighted work:
(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.88
The doctrine must be applied on a case-by-case basis rather than as a
strict rule of law.8 9 Thus, the fair use analysis is a balancing test wherein
the "factors do not represent a score card that promises victory to the

Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 18, 2003) (arguing that, while included in
the enumerated rights under the Copyright Act are the rights to public performance and public
display, "notably absent are any rights to private performance or private display") (emphasis
added).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5).
84. Section 106 states that, "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of
copyright... has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following [enumerated
rights]." 17 U.S.C. § 106.
85. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5677.
86. Id. at 5678. A substantial number of people outside a family might be considered to fall
within the scope of the public performance or public display. See id
87. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003) (laying out the fair use defense to an infringement
claim).
88. Id.
89. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5679; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating "[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.").
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winner of the majority." 90

However, subsequent cases have weighed

certain factors over others. 9' For instance, some courts have weighed
factor (1), whether the new work was "transformative" of the old work,
over the rest of the factors. 92 On the other hand, other courts have held that
the last factor of the fair use doctrine-the effect on the market-is the
most important factor in determining whether there has been fair use.9 3
C. Case Law
It is imperative to look at case precedent surrounding similar
technological and copyright issues in order to follow the trajectory toward
the right of the consumer. While there are no cases directly addressing the
exact issues presented by the DVD playback technology, cutting and
pasting reasoning and policies from similar cases creates a legal quilt for
courts to apply.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,94 the
Supreme Court crossed a major threshold for the advancement of playback
technology by determining that copyright owners did not have complete
control over how consumers use their copyrighted works. 95 In Sony, also
known as "the Betamax case," several copyright holders of television
programs brought an action for contributory copyright infringement against
manufacturers of Betamax home video tape recorders.96 These Betamax
machines enabled consumers to record copies of television programs for
later viewing, an act the Court called "time-shifting., 97 The Court did not
address the issue of whether the videocassette containing a copy of an
90. Pierre N. Leval, TowardaFairUse Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1990).

91. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (arguing
fair use is the most important factor); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
92. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that transformative works "lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright... and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
93. See Harper & Row Publishers,471 U.S. at 566 (saying the fourth factor is "undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use"); see also Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238 (weighing the
fourth factor as "the most important"). But see Leval, supra note 90, at 1124-25 (criticizing the
Court's emphasis on the fourth factor's effect on the market).
94. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
95. See generally id. (holding that Copyright law does not bar private individuals from
taping a certain television program for later viewing).
96. See id.at 420. In Huntsman, the studios allege direct infringement, not contributory
infringement. See supra Part II.
97. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. Time-shifting is the consumer practice of using a VCR to record
a program the consumer cannot watch at the time it is aired, and then watching it at a later, more
convenient time. Id. at 421.
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earlier program constituted a reproduction and proceeded directly to the
fair use analysis.
In holding that the fair use doctrine protected the Betamax machine,
the Court in Sony considered the four fair use criteria--especially the
noncommercial purpose, and the lack of demonstrable impact on the
market. 98 In view of section 107(1) of the Copyright Act-the purpose and
character of the use-the Court reasoned that, "[i]f the Betamax were used
to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would
presumptively be unfair." 99 However, in this case, the purpose of using the
Betamax was for time-shifting for private home use and therefore
constituted a noncommercial use.100 While the Court declared commercial
use "presumptively unfair,"10
' Sony also inferred that noncommercial use
was presumptively a fair use. 10 2 While conceptually the presumption of
noncommercial use as fair use still holds, it has since been contradicted by
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ,103 which disagreed in the application
of a bright-line presumption in an analysis that was designed to consist of
weighing factors. 0 4 Thus, since Campbell, noncommercial
use exhibits an
05
inclination toward fair use rather than a presumption.1
Furthermore, because the purpose of the use was time-shifting, a noninfringing purpose, the fact that the entire work was reproduced "does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use" under
section 107(3).106 As for the fourth factor in the fair use analysis-the
effect on the potential market-Sony held that the plaintiffs failed to prove
their burden of demonstrating either a real or threatened "demonstrable
effect upon the potential market .. ,.l07 Although the copyright holders
expressed fear that time-shifting would adversely effect the ratings or the
amount of persons watching television, they failed to offer any evidence of
potential decrease in television watching by Betamax users or that there
98. See id.at 447-56.
99. See id at 449.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 451 ."A challenge to a non-commercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof.., that the particular use is harmful...."
Id. Thus, the presumption favors
noncommercial use. Id.
103. See 510 U.S. at 584-85.
104. Id. at 577; see also Matthew W. Bower, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New
Digital VCRs: Introducing TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417,433 (2002).
105. Bower, supra note 104, at 433; see also Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use
Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1464-65 (1997) (observing that the Campbell opinion "kills the
canard that commercial use is presumptively unfair.").
106. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2003).
107. Sony,464 U.S. at 450.
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was any market harm. 0 8 Sony continues to be a premiere case in the field
of copyright law for many reasons, but especially because it determined
that a copyright holder did not have absolute control over how and when a
consumer consumed its copyrighted work.10 9
More recently, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
0
Inc.
addressed whether technology that altered the playback of a
videogame, without making permanent alterations to the game cartridge
itself, was a violation of copyright law."' Nintendo brought a copyright
infringement suit against Lewis Galoob Toys, manufacturer of the "Game
Genie.""12 The Game Genie device attached to the actual Nintendo video
game cartridge and allowed players to enter codes to alter their playing
capabilities or gain special strengths in the videogame. 1 3 Although the
codes were not specific to each individual game, it was necessary for the
player to enter the codes provided by the Code Book or a variation on those
codes before playing the game. 114 In asserting its claim, Nintendo relied on
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc. 115 where a
manufacturer of a computer chip was found to have created a derivative
work because the computer chip substantially copied and replaced the
original chip." 6 In Midway, the computer chip was inserted into the preexisting videogames, Galaxian and Pac-Man, and used to speed up the rate
7
of play to make it more difficult."
The Game Genie's method of altering the Nintendo games proved to
be an important factor for Galoob because, unlike the computer chip in
Midway, the Game Genie device did not create an audiovisual display on
its own." 8 In other words, the Game Genie only worked once a Nintendo
108. Id. at 452-54. See also Bower, supra note 104, at 436-38 (discussing the major
theories advanced by the studios to show potential impact on the market).
109. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
110. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 967. Examples of alterations allowed by the Game Genie include increasing the
amount of lives given to the character and altering how the character moves by either speeding it
up or enabling the character to float above obstacles. Id.
114. Id.
115. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
116. See id. at 1013. It is notable that the court in Midway found that the market demand for
speeding up video games aided in concluding a derivative work was created. The court used the
analogy between the demand for 33 RPM records played at an excessive speed of 78 RPM, and
the demand for speeding up a video game, thus making the video game more challenging and
exciting for the player. Id. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969 (discussing Nintendo's reliance on Midway).
117. See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1011, 1013.
118. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968.

498

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:483

game cartridge generated an audiovisual display for the Game Genie to
temporarily alter.119 Once the player was finished using the game, the
Nintendo game cartridge was left intact. 120 Concluding that the transitory
audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie did not constitute
derivative works, Galoob emphasized the fact that the Game Genie only
enhanced the game's output and was, in fact, useless by itself.121 The court
also recognized that the examples given by the Copyright Act described
infringing work that incorporated a portion of the copyrighted work in
some form. 12 2 The court cited Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R. T
Co., 123 where a derivative work was found when the defendant cut
copyrighted artwork out of a book, adhered the artwork to individual
ceramic tiles, and sold the tiles. 124 Although not in a digital form, the tiles
provided basic examples of incorporating a portion of the copyrighted
work. 125 In contrast, the altered output created by the Game Genie "[did]
not contain or produce a Nintendo game's output in some concrete or
permanent form, nor [did] it supplant demand for Nintendo game
cartridges."' 126 Moreover, in response to Nintendo's assertion that the court
should focus on the audiovisual displays generated rather than the source of
the displays, the court concluded that it could not ignore the source of the
display because the source of the display was not embedded within the
Game Genie. 127
Galoob also addressed the hypothetical issue of whether the Game
Genie created a derivative work, and if that work should be protected by

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 969.
122. Id. at 967.
123. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Id.at 1343-44.
125. Id. Note that the court in Galoob acknowledges that the outcome of Mirage would
have been different had the defendants "distributed lenses that merely enabled users to view
several artworks simultaneously." Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968.
126. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969. The court does note, however, that even if it were to accept
Game Genie's displays as fixed, the display would not meet section 101 of the Copyright Act's
definition of "embodied" because none of the audiovisual displays are embodied in the Game
Genie. Id.at 968.
127. Id. at 968. But see Thu M. Nguyen, The Devil and the Genie: Revisiting Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 7 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 52-53 (Fall 1998)
(criticizing Galoob for focusing on the hardware rather than the audiovisual display because the
display is the essence of how a player experiences a game, "[t]hus, in assessing any copyright
infringement claim, it is more accurate to ground an analysis on the audiovisual imagery and
sounds, as opposed to concentrating on whether the offending hardware can produce an
audiovisual experience on its own ....). Id.
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the doctrine of fair use. 128 Instead of focusing on the commercial use by
Galoob as the seller of the Game Genie, the court in Galoob focused on
whether consumers were using the Game Genie for commercial or
noncommercial use. 129 Like the Court in Sony, the court in Galoob based
its fair use analysis on the consumers as noncommercial users, even though
the manufacturer was acting in a commercial market.130 Although the court
discussed each of the four fair use criteria, Galoob focused its fair use
analysis on the fourth factor-the impact on the present and potential
market for the copyrighted works. 13' Because the Game Genie could not
function independently of the Nintendo game cartridge, it could not have
an adverse impact on Nintendo's videogame market. 32 Consumers still
33
must purchase a Nintendo cartridge in order to use the Game Genie.
Furthermore, even though Nintendo asserted that it may, in the future, want
to release similar technology or altered versions of the games, the Ninth
Circuit cited the district court's findings that Nintendo had not considered
manufacturing altered versions of the games 1and
that Nintendo had failed
34
to demonstrate the potential for such a market.
Unlike Galoob, Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc.,' 35 found that "Nuke It,"
a compact disk ("CD") of three-hundred user-created game play levels
compiled by Micro Star to be used in conjunction with FormGen's
computer game "Duke Nukem 3D," was a direct infringement by Micro
Star because it created a derivative work. 136 The derivative work was the
audiovisual display generated when the MAP file, which contained the
exact descriptions of the user-created levels without actually containing any
of the copyrighted art itself, were used in conjunction with the original
game.' 37 The MAP file instructs the game engine as to which image to
display and where it should be displayed. 138 "The MAP file describes the
level in painstaking detail, but it does not actually contain any of the
128. See Galoob, 964 F.2d 965.
129. Id. at 970; see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2003).
130. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
131. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970-72.
132. Id.at 969.
133. Id. at 967.
134. Id. at 971-72.
135. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
136. See id. at 1110, 1113-14. FormGen's computer game already came with the ability to
create customized user levels. Micro Star took this a step further and downloaded 300 usercreated levels and distributed them in a packaged CD form. Id. at 1109.
137. Id. at 1110.
138. Id. The court gave an example to illustrate how the MAP file functions: "the MAP file
might say scuba gear goes at the bottom of the screen. The game engine then goes to the source
art library, finds the image of the scuba gear, and puts it in just the right place on the screen." Id.
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copyrighted art itself; everything that appears on the screen actually comes
139
from the art library."'
Calling the statutory definition of a derivative work "hopelessly
overbroad,"'140 Micro Star reiterated the criteria that Galoob had dictated as
necessary to qualify as a derivative work-a derivative work must "exist in
a 'concrete or permanent form' . . . and must substantially incorporate
protected material from the preexisting work."' 4' Applying these two
factors, Micro Star contrasted the Game Genie to the MAP file on Nuke
It. 142 Unlike Nuke It, the images displayed by the Game Genie were never
43
in "any concrete or permanent form" in the Game Genie itself'
However, the audiovisual displays created by Nuke It and stored in MAP
file assumed a concrete form because the MAP file contained detailed
descriptions of which images from the art library should be selected and
where to put those images. 44 Micro Star reasoned that under Galoob, the
exact description of the audiovisual display programmed into Nuke It
satisfied the concrete form requirement, even if pieces of the original work
45

were not incorporated. 1
The court also concluded that Micro Star was not entitled to a fair use
defense. 146 With respect to the fourth factor, the court reasoned that Micro
Star's program trespassed on FormGen's potential market for new versions
of the Duke Nukem 3D game. 147 Moreover, the court concluded that

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Galoob, 964
F.2d at 967 and Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)).
142. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110-11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1111- 12. In a footnote, the court distinguishes Game Genie from Nuke It by
analogizing the Game Genie to a fictional product called the "Pink Screener." As the court
explains, this product is a piece of pink cellophane that is stretched over a frame and placed in
front of a television, as a result of which the images displayed on the television screen appear
pink. These pink images, although altered versions of the original, do not constitute infringing
derivative works because they do not alter the image in any concrete form. Once the frame is
removed, the pink images cease to exist. However, if someone were to record the pink displays,
then they would have created a derivative work because then a concrete version of the modified
image would have been created. The court suggests that the "Game Genie might be described as
a fancy Pink Screener for video games, changing a value of the game as perceived by the current
player, but never incorporating the new audiovisual display into a permanent or concrete form."
Id. at 1111 n.4.
145. Id. at 1111.
146. See id. at 1113. Micro Star notes that because Galoob had already determined that the
Game Genie was not a derivative work before arriving at the fair use analysis, the fair use
analysis is dicta. Id.
147. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113.
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whether or not FormGen actually took advantage of that market in the
future was irrelevant, because "[o]nly FormGen has the right to enter that
market; whether it chooses to do so is entirely its business. ' 148 It is
important to note that this conclusion is in stark contrast to both Sony and
Galoob in which both courts held that the lack of demonstrable impact on
the potential market weighed in favor of finding fair use. 149 Alternatively,
Micro Star seems to protect the potential market even if the plaintiffs
exhibit no showing of adverse effect on the market, because marketing new
versions of the Duke Nukem story was possible. 50
In deciding issues of copyright infringement, courts have had to
consider the facts in light of the guiding principle of the Copyright Act.' 5 '
Sony articulated the general purpose of the Copyright.Act by citing Article
I of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power... To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'' 52 Sony recognized the dynamic between the author and the
public-"this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors.., in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand... .""' Thus, when
technology seems to have burst the seams of the statutory realm, the
application of the Copyright Act must be made with the underlying purpose
of the act
in mind, to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
54
good."'

1

148. Id. at 1113.
149. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Galoob, 964 F.2d at 965.
150. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113.
151. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969-70. See also Paula Samuelson, Fair Use For Computer
Programsand Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob,
and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 84 (1993) (discussing cases following Sony in which the
purpose of the Copyright Act was considered and applied as a "regulatory regime in which the
public interest must be taken into account in the balancing of interests among participants in

commercial markets.").
152. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 428 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
153. Id. at 429.
154. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 586 (recognizing that fair use analysis, specifically factor two,
necessitates a "recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others," and that all factors are to be considered in light of the purpose of the Copyright Act).

502

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:483

IV. DOES DVD PLAYBACK TECHNOLOGY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF
COPYRIGHT LAW?
In order for the DVD playback software to infringe on the studio's
copyrights, the software must tread upon one of the exclusive rights
enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act. 155 This Comment will
focus on the counterclaims advanced by the studios. According to the
Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Statement Clarifying Claims and their
Response Brief in Opposition to the Player Control Parties' Motion for
Summary Judgment, the studios only assert claims of direct, not
contributory, copyright infringement. 56 Although initially the Defendant
Studios appeared to assert that the Player Control Parties had infringed on
their right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies, and
possibly the right of reproduction,' 57 they have since
focused the allegation
58
solely on their right to prepare derivative works. 1
Although the Defendant Studios do not allege violations of any of
their other enumerated rights, it is helpful to quickly touch on why these
rights are not applicable. As detailed in the Copyright Act of 1976, the
software would have to actually reproduce an original work in order to
constitute a reproduction. 159
Fixation is an essential element of
6
reproduction.1
In the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976,
Congress gives the example of images shown on a television or computer
as images that would fail to meet the fixation requirement.161 An altered
image on the screen is not "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration."'162 In the most superficial sense, ClearPlay,
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
156. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims at 2-3, Huntsman et
al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003); Defendant Motion
Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay, Inc.'s, Trilogy Studio, Inc.'s and
Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,2003).
157. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims at 4, Huntsman et al.
v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003). This clarifying statement
was filed pursuant to direction of the United States District Court of Colorado and at the request
of Plaintiffs and Counter-defendants. Id.at 2.
158. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,
2003).
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
160. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5675.
161. Id.
at 5666.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (emphasis added) (defining "fixed").
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163
MovieMask and MovieShield do not make actual copies of the DVDs.
Instead, the software acts like a filter that skips over specific time
sequences of the DVD during playback.1 64 Regardless of whether the
software contains time coding which correlates to the motion picture, the
software would not constitute a reproduction because it is not an exact copy
of the copyrighted work. Furthermore, the audiovisual display generated
by using the DVD playback software in conjunction with a DVD is not a
reproduction because the filtration software alters the playback so that the
audiovisual display would no longer be a reproduction of the copyrighted
work. Thus, it is no stretch to conclude that the altered audiovisual
displays created by the DVD playback software would easily fall within the
scope of the non-reproduction examples named by Congress.
Similarly, the fundamental right of distribution and sale is not at issue
as it pertains to the DVD playback technologies.1 65 As the Defendant
Studios are well aware, the software companies are not distributing or
selling the copyrighted DVDs; the companies are selling software that
works in conjunction with the copyrighted works.1 66 In asserting that the
Player Control Parties are selling Edited Motion Pictures, which are the
result of the use of filter files with the correlating motion picture DVD, the
studios allege that the Player Control Parties are preparing and distributing
derivative works, not distributing the copyrighted work. 167 Therefore, the
right of distribution and sale is inapplicable in this suit.
The enumerated rights of public performance and public display are
also inapplicable in the instant case. The Defendant Studios make clear
they are not concerned with the consumer's private use of the software in

163. See Press Release, ClearPlay Fires Back to Latest Legal Moves from DGA, Studios:
Hollywood Still Seeking
Ban
on
DVD Parental
Controls (Feb.
3,
2003),
http://www.clearplay.com/3feb20O3.asp (asserting that ClearPlay does not make copies of the
DVD and that the software is downloaded or incorporated into DVD players and filters graphic
violence, profanity, or explicit sex); See MovieMask Products, MOVIEMASK.COM, at
http://moviemask.com/products.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2003) (describing that the software
works directly with the DVD via a buffering system).
164. See Press Release, ClearPlay Fires Back to Latest Legal Moves from DGA, Studios:
Hollywood Still Seeking
Ban on
DVD
Parental Controls (Feb.
3,
2003),
http://www.clearplay.com/3feb2003.asp.
165. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims at 4, Huntsman et
al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003).
166. Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-11, Huntsman et a. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662)
(D.Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
167. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3-4, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,
2003).
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conjunction with the motion picture DVDs. 168 Under the Copyright Act,
the DVD playback software manufacturers are not publicly performing or
displaying the copyrighted DVDs. The software is geared toward private
home use and does not fall under the Copyright Act's definition of

"public," which is defined as "outside of a normal circle of a family."'

69

Regardless of whether the DVD is being performed or displayed, the key
distinction is that the performance or display of the copyrighted work is
taking place in the private domain of the consumer, and therefore, does not
fall under the purview of section 106.170
With the rights of reproduction, distribution and sale, and public
performance and public display eliminated, the only enumerated right at
issue in the lawsuit is whether audiovisual display generated by the DVD
playback software being used in conjunction with the motion picture
creates a derivative work of the copyrighted work.17' In the Response Brief
to the Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Defendant Studios assert that, "[i]t is [the] Edited Motion Picture, created
by the Electronic Editing Party, not the consumer, which is the infringing
derivative work."' 172 The studios describe the Edited Motion Picture as a
combination of the filtering application, the filter file, and the authentic
DVD. 17 3 The Defendant Studios allege the Edited Motion Picture is
"functionally equivalent" to what a consumer would watch if he or she
viewed the same motion picture prepared by the third party editors like
168. See id. at 8 n.5 (calling the consumer's in-home use irrelevant).
169. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5677.
170. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-4, Huntsman et al.
v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed June 18, 2003). Electronic Frontier asserted
that the "unauthorized 'versions' to which the studious object are really just unauthorized
'performances' over which the Copyright Act grants them no control .... Private performances
and the technology that enables them, cannot infringe the studios' copyrights." Id. at 6.
171. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims at 4, Huntsman et
al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003).
172. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay, Inc.'s,
Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at
3, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8, 2003). In the
Opposition Brief, the Studio Defendants focused their allegation on one combined derivative
work, the Edited Motion Picture. See id However, it is interesting to note that the Studio
Defendants had alleged in their Statement Clarifying Claims that there were two derivative works
created: (1) the edited version of the film and (2) the products, e.g. filtering software. See
Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Statement Clarifying Claims at 5, Huntsman et al. v.
Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Mar. 11, 2003).
173. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,
2003).
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CleanFlicks. 74 In order to support this contention, the Defendant Studios
conclude that a derivative work does not require fixation in order to be
deemed infringing.175 They rely on the Copyright Act and case precedent
to form this conclusion. 76 The Copyright Act reads, "[a] derivative
work... may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in
tangible form."' 177 Furthermore, Galoob stated that fixation is not required,
although the court did continue on to say the work must be embodied in
"permanent or concrete 'form." 1 78 The Defendant Studios rely on Micro
Star v. FormGen, Inc. 179 to clarify the "concrete or permanent form"
standard.180 In Micro Star, the Ninth Circuit held that a CD containing
detailed software instructions that instructed the game engine what object
to display and where to display it on the screen, constituted an infringing
derivative work.' 81 The Defendant Studios liken the Edited Motion
Pictures to the audio visual displays generated by the CD in that they assert
the Edited Motion Pictures "would be considered 'permanently and
concretely' embodied in the individual motion picture-specific
Filter Files,
182
works.'
derivative
infringing
deemed
and would be
On the opposing side, the Player Control Parties clearly assert that the
edited motion picture resulting from the combination of an authentic DVD
and the corresponding filter file does not produce an infringing derivative
work. 183 According to the analysis in Galoob, a work will be found to be
an infringing derivative work if it incorporates the copyrighted work and
embodies it in some "concrete . . . 'form."",184 Also relevant to the analysis
174. Id.
175. Id. at5.
176. Id.
177. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (5 Stat.) 5664, 5675.
178. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
1992).
179. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
180. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,
2003).
181. See generally Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (This
statement reflects the holding of the case.).
182. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay, Inc.'s,
Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at
6, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8, 2003).
183. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 27-33, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
184. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967; see also Edward G. Black & Michael H. Page, Add-On
Infringements: When Computer Add-Ons and Peripherals Should (and Should Not) Be
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is whether the derivative work supersedes the demand for the original
work. 85 Although these criteria tend to overlap in application, this
Comment will address them individually.
Taking the first of these criteria and applying it to the Edited Motion
Picture, the displayed version does not incorporate the work in some
concrete form. The Defendant Studios may assert that the movie displayed
through the filtration system is substantially similar to the original work
and that display embodies the original DVD in some concrete form. In
fact, only a few minutes are skipped out of a two-hour movie.186 However,
this argument is superseded by two factors. Although the studios will
represent that the displayed version is in fact a closely similar display of the
original DVD, the altered display is not embodied in some concrete form.
This lack of permanence will overshadow the transitory "incorporation" the
consumer sees when the viewer watches a filtered DVD playback.
Furthermore, the court in Galoob refused to separate the audiovisual
display from the
software itself because the software was the source of
87
those displays. 1
Moreover, even if the studios are able to successfully assert that the
derivative work must be fixed, the "embodiment" contained in the filter file
is still not a derivative work. The filter file which instructs the DVD to
skip and mute offensive content, "consist[s] solely of timing codes and
skip/mute instructions that affect the playback of a motion picture
DVD."18 The filter file does not contain any content from the original
motion picture nor does it contain any descriptive instructions. 18 9 The
DVD playback software may be similar to the MAP file in Micro Star in
Considered Infringing Derivative Works Under Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica,
Inc., and Other Recent Decisions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 615, 621 (1993) (breaking
down the derivative works analysis in Galoob to four restrictions, including incorporation of the
original work, embodiment in some concrete form, substantially similar to the original work, and
supplanting the market demand for the original). The requirement of some embodiment in a
concrete form may seem counterintuitive to the Congressional intent that derivative works need
not be fixed. However, the Ninth Circuit in Galoob concluded that the examples of derivative
works included examples where the derivative work embodied portions of the copyrighted work
in some form. Id. at 625.
185. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969.
186. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman (No. 02-M- 1662) (giving as an example,
"if profanity is heard from 00:12:59:00 to 00:12:59:20 on a DVD, the Filter File will identify the
nine-second segment to be skipped"). Id.
187. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968.
188. Counterdefendant ClearPlay Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of the Player Control
Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Studios' Copyright Claims at 14, Huntsman et al.
v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 15, 2003).
189. See id.

2004]

MODIFIED TO FIT YOUR SCREEN

the respect that both contain instructions that direct the DVD player or
game engine. 190 However, the execution of those instructions is the key
distinction between the filter files and the MAP file. Although the MAP
file in Micro Star did not contain any content from the copyrighted work,
the MAP file did contain exact and detailed descriptions that instructed the
game engine to choose certain images from the art library and then
instructed the game engine on where to place those images.191 In stark
contrast, the DVD playback software contains time-codes and instructs the
DVD to skip or mute certain scenes, but not to selectively exchange
specific content in a scene to something else. 192 For example, if the filter
file instructed the DVD player to substitute an object in a scene for another,
then the filter file would be similar to the MAP file. However, the filter
files created by the software companies in this suit-as they stand noware incapable of substituting objects. 193 The filter files contain only timecoding instructions, and not descriptions of what content is being skipped.
Initially, employees creating the time-coding instructions may generate a
list which describes the content to be omitted. Or, in the future, technology
may include a list detailing the content of skipped scenes. For now,
however, the filter file only consists of time coding instructions with no
description of the omitted content.
Additionally, for the same reasons the court in Micro Star
distinguished Nuke It from the Game Genie in Galoob, the DVD playback
194
software does not incorporate substantial versions of the original work.
Here, the DVD, not the software, generates the audiovisual displays.' 95
The studios may represent that the original "Duke Nukem" game in Micro
Star also provided the actual images. However, the DVD playback
software does not contain the extent of instructions that the MAP file does.
While the software references the time-coding on the DVDs to instruct the
player where to skip, there is no content or sequential visuals described in

190. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110.
191. Id.
192. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, 8, 12, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003) (specifying how the software only skips or mutes offensive
content).
193. See discussion infra Part VII (discussing implications of future technology capable of
substituting objects).
194. See Micro Star, 154 F.3dat 1111.
195. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M1662) (D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
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the software itself.196 Like the Game Genie, the software does not
incorporate the original film, but only acts as a filter through which the
DVD plays. 197 In contrast, the MAP file is "smarter" in that it contains
exact descriptions that instruct the game engine which images to choose
from the art library and then instructs the game engine where to place those
images.1 98 Additionally, Galoob accorded some weight to the fact that the
Game Genie was useless in itself, in that it had to be used in conjunction
with an authentic Nintendo game cartridge in order to function.' 99
Similarly, the DVD playback software cannot generate images on its own
and is useless by itself. 200
No permanent modifications are made and the alterations are
transitory because once the DVD is finished being played, the alterations
cease to exist. 20 ' The DVD playback software is similar to the Game Genie

videogame alteration device in Galoob in that its alteration is transitory. 0 2
The Defendant Studios assert that the filtered motion picture is not a
transitory alteration because any consumer who combines the authentic
DVD and corresponding filter file with the same viewing options will view
the exact same film. 20 3 In fact, the Defendant Studios assert that the Edited

Motion Picture is "functionally equivalent" to the edited film created by the
retail editing parties who make physical changes to the films. 20 4 However,
as ClearPlay responded in its Reply Brief, "[c]opyright law does not
impose liability on the creation of mere 'functional equivalents' of
infringing works., 20 5 Although consumers may view sanitized films under
either method of alteration, the transitory alterations triggered by the filter
files are legally distinct from the physical edits made by the retailers. Thus,

196. See discussion supra Part II.A.
197. See discussion supra Part III.A.
198. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110.
199. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969.
200. See discussion supra Part III.A.
201. See discussion supra Part III.A.
202. See discussion supra Part III.C.; see Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967.
203. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay, Inc.'s,
Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at
7 n.4, 12, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8, 2003).
204. Id. at 4.
205. Counterdefendant ClearPlay Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of the Player Control
Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Studios' Copyright Claims at I n.I, Huntsman et
al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Dec. 15, 2003). However, ClearPlay also
states, "[w]hile 'functional equivalence' arguments may be relevant later if the case does not
conclude with this [summary judgment] motion-they work in ClearPlay's favor on questions of
fair use-they are not relevant to the present dispute over the scope of the 'derivative works'
right." Id.
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the DVD playback software also fails to meet the requirements of
incorporation and embodiment.
Additionally, the Edited Motion Picture cannot supplant the market
for the copyrighted work because consumers need the authentic DVD to
utilize the corresponding filter file. The software could never supersede the
demand for the original DVD because the display cannot be generated
without the DVD.2 °6 In order to use the filtering software, a DVD must
first always be purchased or rented.

V. EVEN

IF IT IS A VIOLATION, CAN THE TECHNOLOGY

BE PROTECTED

UNDER FAIR USE?

Should the court conclude that DVD playback software used in
conjunction with authentic DVDs creates an unauthorized derivative work,
the Player Control Parties may have a viable fair use defense. In order for
the DVD playback technology to find protection under the fair use
doctrine, the court must apply and balance the factors delineated in 17
U.S.C. section 107 in favor of finding fair use.20 7
Section 107(1) of the Copyright Act involves a consideration of the
purpose and character of the use. 20 8 Although the noncommercial aspect of
the use no longer creates a presumption of fair use, the fact that it is for
noncommercial use within the private domain of the home lends itself
toward an inclination of finding fair use. 20 9 DVD playback software is not
for commercial use, but rather for the use of the consumers for private
performance in their homes.210 On the other hand, the studios may point to
the fact that the software manufacturers are participating in a commercial
market by manufacturing and selling the DVD playback technology to
consumers. However, both Sony and Galoob focused on the in-home use
of the device once purchased, rather than the original commercial
transaction that took place between the manufacturer and the consumer.2 1
Thus, the noncommercial use of the DVD playback software leans toward
206. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969.
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
208. Id.§ 107(1).
209. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994).
210. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662)
(D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003). The software is presently only licensed for in-home use. See id.
211. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33; see Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992). Cf Castle
Rock Entm't, Inc., v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998).
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an inclination of fair use.
Section 107(1) also warrants a consideration of whether the new work
is "transformative. 21 2 To be deemed transformative, the court must
consider whether the new work supersedes the original work or instead
transforms it by "add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or
different character, [thus] altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message ....
,,3 The DVD playback software manufacturers will assert
that the character of the use is transformative since, while the software may
only skip small portions, the film viewed without the offensive portions
creates a sanitized film. As one article suggests, "arguably, removal of
graphic language, sex, and violence gives these [sanitized] films a different
character. ' 2 14 This sanitized film is a result of careful considerations and
choices made by employees of the software companies to remove certain
content they deem would be offensive to purchasers of the software.1 5
Thus, there are creative choices being made when the employees determine
which portions should be skipped in order to transform the film into its
sanitized, transitory version. 216 Some critics of the software have
commented that the filter files are so transformative that they actually
change the film's message. For example, in the film "Proof of Life, 2 17 the
ClearPlay Filters mask the entire opening sequence involving the
kidnapping and rebel brutality that sets up the film, thus, excising
information that leaves holes in the plot. 218 Or, from a technical point of
view, the skips in the film have been criticized as being so disjointed that
the filtering software changes the character and pace of the movie.21 9
While these may be criticisms of the execution of the filter files, these
comments reflect that the sanitized film is transformative.

212. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
213. Id. at 579.
214. Lee, supra note 5, at 50.
215. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662)
(D. Colo. filed June 5, 2003) (describing the process by which software employees review films
and create filter files).
216. See id.
217. PROOF OF LIFE (Castle Rock Entm't 2000).
218. See Richmond, supra note 35 (describing how the ClearPlay filters adversely impacted
the plot line of the film "Proof of Life.").
219. Shannon Starr, New Business Offers "Sanitized" Movies, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 30,
2003, at Al (quoting Robert Rosen, dean of the UCLA School of Theatre, Film and Television,
who has submitted his criticism of the altered versions to the United States District Court in
Colorado, and declared that the edits in "Proof of Life" mutilated the movie and that the
ClearPlay edits in "The Hurricane" skipped over necessary scenes and language and "essentially
create[d] a different movie for the viewing audience than that intended by the director...").
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On the other hand, the studios may counter that the use is nontransformative because the software ultimately filters out a small portion of
the film. Depending on the extent of the objectionable content of the film,
a very small number of segments could be skipped, thus leaving the film's
message in tact. The Defendant Studios may further assert that regardless
of the amount of film skipped during playback, the film that remains still
encapsulates the film's message and expression. 220 However, as one court
stated, "a secondary work need not necessarily transform the original
work's expression to have a transformative purpose ....
,,221Therefore,
even if the original film's expression remains in tact, the choices made to
excise the film of offensive content are transformative enough to satisfy
this factor.
Whether the use is deemed to be noncommercial, the studios will
assert that the character of the use is not transformative enough to weigh in
favor of finding fair use. The software manufacturers' transformative
argument is debatable especially in the situation where there is very little
objectionable content to be skipped.22 2 Therefore, this factor may be
divided. It is likely that the transformative consideration will weigh in
favor of the studios. However, the fact that this DVD playback software is
licensed solely for in-home use, rather than commercial use, will likely
weigh in favor of finding fair use.
The court must next look at the nature of the copyrighted work under
section 107(2) in its fair use balancing analysis.223 The nature of the work
analysis "determines whether the work is the type of material that copyright
was designed to stimulate, and whether the secondary use proposed would
interfere significantly with the original author's entitlements., 224 The
Court in Sony gave little discussion to this aspect of the fair use analysis;
Sony simply recognized that consumers originally had been invited to
watch the television programs without paying for them so that time-shifting
did not interfere with the copyright owner's entitlements. 225 However, the
Defendant Studios will most likely distinguish the filtering of films here
from the time-shifting of televised programs in Sony. Furthermore, the
studio will probably direct attention to the nature of the copyrighted work,
220. Lee, supra note 5, at 50 (theorizing that "[n]o new purpose, meaning, or message is
intended in the edited films, which seem to remain as close to the original as possible ... .
221. Castle Rock Entm 't, 150 F.3d at 143.
222. Lee, supra note 5, at 50.

223. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2003).
224. Leval, supra note 90, at 1119.
225. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 (giving a brief discussion of the nature of television as a
copyrighted audiovisual work).
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the motion picture, as one that is recognized as creative, which will most
likely weigh against a finding of fair use. As one article recognizes, "the
nature of the copyrighted motion pictures, would likely weigh against fair
use, since the more creative a work is, the less likely unauthorized copying
will be permitted., 226 Although this factor weighs against finding fair use
because motion pictures are heavily protected works, it will ultimately be
outweighed by the other fair use factors.
The third factor of the fair use analysis requires a consideration of the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole. ''227 The fact that the films are displayed with little filtered
content will weigh in the studios' favor. The studios will most likely argue
that almost the entire copyrighted work is used because the DVD playback
software only filters out offensive content, which in some films constitutes
very little of the film. Thus, the DVD playback technology actually allows
the display of the entire film, save for the select pieces which are filtered
out during playback. For example, in a ClearPlay filtered version of
Spiderman,221 ClearPlay only filtered out "a single f-word, 15 'profane
references to a deity' and some violence. 22 9 With a running time of one
hundred and twenty-one minutes, these filtered portions probably do not
even equate to ten percent of the entire film. 230 This factor will likely
weigh in favor of the studios.
The fourth factor, which focuses on the effect on the potential market,
must also be considered, and potentially carries more weight than the other
factors.231 As stated in Sony, if the use has no "demonstrable effect" upon
the market or potential market for the copyrighted work, then the use is
232
Theoretically, the availability of
protected under the fair use doctrine.
the DVD technology could actually improve the market for sales and
rentals of DVDs rather than adversely impact the market. 233 By allowing
226. Lee, supra note 5, at 50.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
228. SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
229. Baig, supra note 47, at D3 (detailing the ClearPlay filtered version of Spiderman).
230. SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
231. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
232. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
233. See Jan Laitos, Is It Illegal To Sanitize Video Rentals?, 9NEwS.COM (Jan. 31, 2003), at
http://www.9news.com/storyfullissue.asp?id-10786 (suggesting software companies will argue
that sanitizing movies will enlarge the market and that all parties will receive an economic benefit
from the software); see also David Stevenson, Hollywood Shines Spotlight on Censoring
),
at
2002
(Aug.
23,
TECHTV.cOM
Software,
http://www.techtv.com/news/culture/story/0,24195,3397205,00.html) (quoting Breck Rice, cofounder of Trilogy Studios, as stating that the technology will benefit the studios in the long run
because, "[w]e're personalizing movies now.., which would broaden their market."). Id.
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films with an R or PG-13 rating to become G rated so that all audiences
may view them, this software will expand the consumer base for films that
originally might not have been purchased by families with young
children.2 34
Conversely, the studios could counter that the playback technology
adversely impacts the potential market for studios to market their own
sanitized versions and that the potential for a beneficial affect is
irrelevant. 235 Studios may assert an argument similar to the one held by the
court in Micro Star that it was irrelevant whether FormGen in actuality
took advantage of the potential market in the future.236 As stated in Micro
Star, "[o]nly FormGen has the right to enter that market; whether it
chooses to do so is entirely its business., 237 Although potential market
share was unimportant to the finding in Micro Star, the studios are in a
better position to assert harm to the potential market because they have
begun the slow crawl into this market.238 Studios have already begun to
enter a similar market by adding extra features on DVDs like director
commentary or interviews. 239 Therefore, it would arguably be simple for
the studios to also add a sanitized version as yet another "value-added
feature., 240 Furthermore, the creation of a sanitized version will not be a
heavy burden on the studios assuming they have already exerted time and
money creating a censored version for network television and films shown
on airplanes. 24 1 Also, the studios will attack the software manufacturers'
argument that the existence of software will improve the film sales and
rentals market because the profit will go to the infringers rather than the
copyright holders.242
234. See Breedlove, supra note 28, at 8 (discussing arguments for CleanFlicks). Although
this article specifically addresses the claims against CleanFlicks, the fair use effect on the market
arguments made in favor of CleanFlicks also carry over to ClearPlay and other software
manufacturers in the economic benefit sense. Breedlove notes that CleanFlicks will give studios
the benefit of more viewers because individuals who may have been prevented (by their parents)
to see an original, unaltered film will now be able to view it. Id.
235. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1482 (9th Cir. 1988) (demonstrating that it
was irrelevant that an unauthorized motion picture based on a copyrighted book "will have no
adverse effect ...and may in fact have a beneficial effect..
236. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113.

237. Id.
238. See id.; see Clark, supra note 10.
239. See Clark, supra note 10.
240. Lee, supra note 5, at 52.
241. See Lee, supra note 5, at 48; see Clark, supranote 10.
242. See Richmond, supra note 59. The DGA's website addresses the financial impact on
directors: "it could be said that directors will lose money if these companies are put out of
business, because they will not get the residuals they were getting when the companies purchased
the original versions." Id. In this statement the DGA essentially admits that there is financial
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However, in the end, it is unlikely to harm the potential market for
studios to distribute their own sanitized versions. The present DVD
playback technology requires that the consumer necessarily purchase a
DVD to run the filtering software. Only the profits from sales of the DVD
playback software will go to the software companies, although the
Defendant Studios argue that these are, in actuality, profits from Edited
Motion Pictures derived from their copyrighted films. 243 Any increase in

film sales necessarily will still go to the studios producing the original
work.244 There is no valid fear of a piracy issue because the software will
not filter bootleg copies of a DVD.24 5 Furthermore, if the criticism is true,
that the software's edits are choppy and disjointed, consumers arguably
will be more inclined to purchase studio-generated versions that are of
better quality.246
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

There are strong policy considerations surrounding the new sanitizing
technology which must be examined. The DVD playback software
manufacturers have compelling policy arguments for general consumer
rights, the right of parental control, and the path of technology. Just as
artists' interests are protected by the Copyright Act, consumers' interests
are also protected.24 7 Controlling how consumers watch DVDs in the
privacy of their own home treads upon a consumer's right of autonomy to
control how and when she views her legitimately purchased or rented
DVD. 248 The DVD playback software is analogous to a Betamax or Game
gain to be had by this market-specifically stating this gain in terms of the director. Although
this argument is made directly against CleanFlicks, one could argue the same for the DVD
playback software manufacturers and their beneficial impact on the studio's market.
243. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studio, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8,
2003).
244. See generally Clark, supra note 10 (reasoning that because studios own the copyrights
for the films, they receive any increase in profits).
245. Peter Kiefer, ClearPlay Files Response in Video Editing Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Jan. 7, 2003.
246. See Starr, supra note 219, at Al (citing criticism of the technology); see Lee, supra
note 5, at 48 (calling the family-friendly edits "crude in comparison to the original editing").
247. See generally Liu, supra note 5, at 406-21 (going so far as to refer to the consumer's
"authorship").
248. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(finding that the distributors of copyrighted works do not have a right to control how their works
are enjoyed in the privacy of the consumers' homes); see also Liu, supra note 5, at 406 (defining
"autonomy" as "freedom in choosing when, how, and under what circumstances to consume a
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Genie in that it simply enhances the enjoyment of the copyrighted work
without permanently altering the work. As recognized in the Journal of
Intellectual Property Law, "[c]onsumers may use a Betamax to view
copyrighted works at a more convenient time. They similarly may use a
Game Genie to enhance a Nintendo Game cartridge's audiovisual play in
such a way as to make the experience more enjoyable. ' 249 Furthermore, the
door to this type of consumer control was opened in Sony when the Court
held that a television viewer could record a program and watch it at a later
time. 250 The holding in Sony "seemed to recognize implicitly a consumer
interest in dictating when and where to view that particular work and,
correspondingly, a limit on the ability of the copyright owner to dictate the
circumstances of such consumption. 25 1
Besides the general consumer-control policy consideration, parents
constitute a particularized consumer control consideration. The filters
designed by DVD playback software manufacturers "simply deputize
parents to be ratings board surrogates., 252 As one article stated, "[i]t's the
digital equivalent to your mom slapping her hand over your eyes in the
theater .... , 2 5 3 Ultimately, parents should have a right to protect their
children from content offensive to their familial moral code.
It is also relevant to consider the direction of consumer-geared
technology because it shows a path towards customizing the in-home
consumer experience. Andrew Bridges, attorney for ClearPlay, alleges
that, "[i]f ClearPlay is illegal, then so is the remote control. 254 One cannot
avoid the obvious similarities between this technology and the remote
control. As with a remote control, the consumer is making the decision to
use the device to alter the playback of the copyrighted work. Furthermore,
the remote control and software serve similar purposes: they allow
consumers "who wish to participate in the mainstream of American cultural
experience but do not wish to hear words or see things that are
objectionable to them," to do so. 25 5 On the other hand, the editorial control
allowed by this DVD playback technology is arguably different from the
remote control or the quickzap feature of ReplayTV because with the latter

copyrighted work.").
249. Samuelson, supra note 151, at 84.
250. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
251. Liu, supra note 5, at 408; see Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
252. Goldstein, supra note 1, at E6.
253. Benny Evangelista, The Digital Censor: Utah Firm Locked in Legal Battle Over
Software that Blocks Out Sex and Violence on DVDs, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2003, at El.
254. Id.
255. Lee, supra note 5, at 48.

516

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:483

types of controls, the consumer ultimately determines and selects which
content will be skipped. However, while Bridge's statement may seem
drastic and dramatic, it may not be far from the truth. In the case of
ClearPlay, the purchaser is essentially handing the fast-forward control
over to a technological device. Ultimately, the initial decision is the
same-whether or not to exclude select portions, even though the execution
of that alteration is different.
On the other hand, the directors and studios have competing policy
arguments. To counter consumer control, the studios could assert that
consumers are already given control: they can decide to watch or not to
watch a film, or to fast-forward or mute the film during playback. 56
Furthermore, it is the parents who should be responsible for censoring what
programming their children watch. There is no question that parents have
the right to expose their children to whatever programs they see fit. If they
object to a film, they simply should not show it to their children or they
257
should manually fast-forward past any content they find inappropriate.
At its core, there is a distinct difference between manually fast-forwarding
through objectionable content and having software that customizes the film
for you. As one director named in the lawsuit stresses, "morality is still
being programmed into a device that is claimed to be amorphous. 258 On
the other hand, the software could be viewed merely as a time saver, faster
and more accurate than a fast-forward button.
There is also the purpose behind copyright: to promote creativity and
public access. 259 However, this purpose cuts both ways. By stopping this
software technology, the studios will be blocking public access to films and
stunting the advancement of consumer geared technology. 260 As stated in
an Amicus Brief filed by Intel Corporation, finding for the directors and
studios "would do more than remove a parent-friendly tool from the
market; it would chill innovation and stifle the development of new

256. See Press Release, Writers Guild of America, WGA News: WGAw Condemns Lawsuit
Targeting Directors-Guild President Speaks Out Against CleanFlicks Federal Lawsuit Against 16
Directors (Sep. 3, 2002), http://www.wga.org/pr/0902/speaks.html.
257. Edward C. Baig, Skipping the Bad Stuff Isn't Always So Good, USATODAY.COM (Jan.
21, 2003), at http://usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2003-01-21-baigx.htm.
258. Richmond, supra note 35.
259. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
260. Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay, Inc.'s,
Trilogy Studio, Inc.'s and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at
2, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 8, 2003) (The
studios directly discount that proposition by stating, the "copyright infringement claims are not an
effort to halt innovative 'technologies' nor do they concern the legality of how consumers watch
movies in their own homes.").
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generations of products, including products designed to empower the
individual and enhance the consumer's lawful and reasonable enjoyment of
lawfully acquired entertainment content ....
,,26
1 The counterargument is
that a victory for the software companies would weaken the control studios
have over their copyrights.2 62 Allowing this sort of editing
will open the
263
features.
customizing
objectionable
more
other,
doors to
Ultimately, finding that the DVD playback technology infringes on
the studios' copyrights will regress or even sacrifice the autonomy rights of
consumers to watch their legitimately purchased or rented DVDs when and
how they choose. These consumer interests are particularly critical and,
therefore, must be given adequate consideration by courts, which tend to
focus solely on legal analysis in copyright actions.2 64
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY

While the ClearPlay, MovieMask, and MovieShield software should
not be found to infringe on copyright law, the next generation of similar
technology may be on the other side of the infringing fence. In fact, there
are already indications that these and other software manufacturers are
responding to an audible consumer demand to temporarily add content
(rather than temporarily mask offensive content).265 While software like
ClearPlay only mutes obscene language or skips over scenes containing
nudity and violence, other software companies are already experimenting
with more extreme and advanced masking techniques. In a demonstration
shown for MovieMask, instead of simply skipping over the nude Kate
Winslet in Titanic, the software is programmed to instruct the DVD player
to digitally insert a corset over her naked body.266 Another promised
innovation by MovieMask is demonstrated in the blockbuster movie The
Matrix,267 where "alien-like green goo"
replaced blood when Keanu Reeves
268
guards.
building
the
character shoots
261. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Intel Corporation in Support of Counterdefendant ClearPlay
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh etal. (No. 02-M-1662)
(D. Colo. filed July 11, 2003).
262. See Lee, supra note 5,at 51.
263. See discussion infra Part VII.
264. See Liu, supra note 5, at 428 (suggesting that in the context of litigation, the court
should also consider the consumer's autonomy rights).
265. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 5, at 48.
266. Clark, supra note 10 (discussing the difference between various software
technologies).
267. MATRIX (Silver Pictures 1999).
268. Roy Santos, First Look: Trilogy Studios MovieMask, TECHTV.COM (Feb. 8, 2002), at
http://www.techtv.com/products/print/0,23102,3371490,00.html.
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Although replacing blood with green goo may not seem that drastic, it
is the essence of the idea that is troubling. Many articles have already
begun to theorize about potential developments in playback technology
stemming from this sort of leeway. 269 For example, the technology that
would allow a corset to cover Kate Winslet in Titanic270 could also provide
the ability to change the product placement in a film or provide interactive
options. 27 Opening the door to this type of editing may, in the end, shift
control away from consumers and toward marketers. There was a similar
concern in the advent of digital video recorders like TiVo and ReplayTV
where "the compromises [, such as disabling the commercial skipping
capability,] may reach a point where the consumer's interests are sacrificed
to the need for deep-pocketed industry partners. 2 72 As Jack Valenti,
Motion Picture Association of America CEO has stated, "[t]here are those
who would revise a film for what they claim to be benign reasons. But
273
there are others who would alter for pornographic or obscene reasons.'
Similar to Valenti's ideas, the DGA's website projects that such technology
could allow consumers to remove political opinions or other portions of the
story that they may find personally undesirable.274 Critics also suggest that
giving consumers this sort of control could lead to more dramatic
alterations to personalize the films, including changing the names of
characters or superimposing images of family members.275
Implications of the potential future technology in the same vein as
the DVD playback technology indicate possible violations of copyright
law. At this stage, where the DVD playback software is simply skipping
over offensive content, there is no copyright infringement. But, as the
sampling of above theories suggests, there are already indications that the
next generation of technological gadgets may potentially overstep its
bounds. The line is crossed when software starts inserting content or
images rather than just muting or skipping forward, like one would do with
269. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 253, at E4. Some articles have also theorized about
similar technologies for other medias. James Burger, one intellectual property attorney with
Dow, Lohnes & Albertson of Washington D.C., asks, "What if I create a piece of software that
allows each individual user to manipulate (a newspaper story) so they feel better about reading
it?" Id.
270. TITANIC (20th Century Fox 1997).
271. See Santos, supra note 268 (discussing future interactive technology, the potential
ability to change products in a film, or even provide internet connections detailing products in the
film).
272. Bill Carter, Personal Video Recorder: Will This Machine Change Television?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1999, at C1.
273. Baig, supra note 47 (quoting Jack Valenti).
274. See Richmond, supra note 59.
275. Lee, supra note 5, at 51.
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a remote control. The extent of the alteration determines whether there will
be a threat of copyright infringement because, as content is inserted or
replaced, the new work enters the realm of derivative works and the fair
use doctrine. 276 As some of the potential developments mentioned above
suggest, the software would need to input or store information that would
be detailed enough to replace and enter into the pre-existing work. For
example, technology that could change product placement in films would
need to be sophisticated enough to select the item to be replaced and then
supply a detailed description of the new product. 277 This is the kind of use
the courts in Midway and Micro Star found to be infringing. 278 Like in
Midway and Micro Star, the enhanced software, by providing detailed
descriptions that would replace existing content
in the film, would become
279
file.
MAP
a
or
chip
computer
a
like
more
Software that deletes significant portions of a film may also begin to
cross the line into copyright infringement because of the extent of the
alteration. This aspect is exhibited by the choices these software
companies make when deciding which films to filter. It would seem that
some films should be left alone because running them through the software
would annihilate any semblance of a story. As one news columnist
280
reported after watching a filtered version of Black Hawk Down,
"[s]houldn't a war movie depict war's horrors? ' 281 However, some of the
software manufacturers are already sensitive to this concern. MovieShield
acknowledges that it does not provide software for all motion pictures
because "[i]f... the programming will compromise the integrity of the
motion picture, it will not be programmed., 282 Martin Scorsese has also
pointed out that "not every picture is meant to be seen by everyone[,]
especially children., 283 Software manufacturers will need to take these
concerns into account when choosing for which films to create filter files.
276. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2), 107(1), 107(3) (2003). See generally Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l,
Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (9th
Cir. 1998).
277. See Santos, supranote 268 (discussing future interactive technology, the potential ability
to change products in a film, or even provide internet connections detailing products in the film).
278. See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013; see also Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110-12.
279. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110 (describing a MAP file).
280. BLACK HAWK DOWN (Columbia Pictures Corp. 2001).
281. Baig, supranote 257.
282. Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Huntsman et al. v. Soderbergh et al. (No. 02-M-1662) (D.
Colo. filed June 5, 2003).
283. Bruce Elder, Artificial Indignation, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 8, 2003, at 8
(quoting Martin Scorsese) (internal quotations omitted).

520

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:483

"It could potentially make 'Scarface' feel like an episode of the 'Brady
Bunch.' 284 Or instead, it could skip so much content that there would be
nothing left for the viewer to watch.
Rather than opposing these advancements, the studios should join
forces with these software companies so that a profitable partnership could
result. By working together, the studios and software companies could
potentially arrive not only at a consensus as to how to maintain the integrity
of the filtered films, but also how to profit financially from the software.
The VCR, DVD player, TiVo, and ReplayTV have all proved to be a
success for consumers, manufacturers, and the studios.285 The DVD
playback technology could easily be the next step.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Player Control Parties named in the Huntsman lawsuit should be
granted their Motion for Summary Judgment. If the court denies the
motion, then the court should find the software manufacturers not liable of
copyright infringement. Or, conversely, the court should find the software
companies have a viable defense under the fair use doctrine. 28 6 The
potential future incarnations of DVD playback technology present
situations which already seem to be crossing the line into copyright
infringement.2 87 This Comment is not meant to address or conclude that
those future technologies should be allowed (or disallowed). In their
present state, the ClearPlay, MovieMask, and MovieShield software should
be permitted to continue to be manufactured and sold to the benefit of all
parties involved.
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